So I’m in a philosophy class this semester called “Mind, World, and Knowledge” and we’re getting into the “mind” part of the course. At the moment, we’re looking at the debate between Dualism (the mind and body are separate things) and Materialism (the mind is a material thing) and while there are a ton of different positions within these broad categories, that’s the basic gist of it. Thus far in the course, everything we’ve considered has seemed pretty good on its own, at least until we get into criticisms coming from other philosophers. So I’ve been open-minded and accepted that they may have a point with what they’re trying to say.
Getting into Dualism, it’s been really hard to do that. And that bothers me a lot, oddly enough. What am I learning if I cheer for every little argument against what we’re considering and can’t think of anything but problems with the position? That doesn’t mean it’s wrong, just that I’m looking for it to be wrong, or want it to be wrong, because of my own personal bias. Dualism isn’t literally about some kind of soul or mystical property or another of our minds, but it’s hard to escape the influence when you’re trying to separate the mind as a thing from our brain and our bodies. I’m sure that contributes to my bias against it - in a kind of abstract way, I would certainly say we have a soul or something along those lines, but I’d see that as something that arises out of what we are. As in, you have a soul because you think and hold ideas about things and all of that comprises the “soul” of who you are. I guess I’m saying it’s equivalent to your identity.
At any rate, that’s a Materialist position (or maybe Idealist…? that’s something about ideas making us who we are, or something) and pretty clearly shows my bias against what we’re learning. It just seems wrong and ignorant to look at this as somehow better than Dualism just because it’s the thing I happen to think is right. It’s a totally natural way to be, and just about everyone is that way. But does that make it right? If everyone is wrong, that doesn’t necessarily make it any better.
I’m not bothered by the idea that I could be wrong, really - if some form of Dualism turned out to be right, well, that’s just great. Today’s topic, specifically, was a philosopher trying to show that sensations are proof of Dualism. A few of the examples he used were afterimages and pain. Now, I can tell you that there are specific types of nerve fibres for experiencing pain, and if you get distracted you can actually not perceive the sensation of pain your nerves are actually bringing to your brain. I can also tell you that, because of a certain way your eyes work and the neurons for sight work, afterimages are caused when they fire in reverse after a stimulus is taken away. So you stare at the sun and close your eyes, and you’ll keep seeing some colours. This is a purely physical, or material, thing - you’ve got neurons firing and they’re creating this sensation you’re having.
Dualism is the idea that the mind is somehow separate from the body - so this philosopher was saying that the perception of things such as sounds and etc (sensations) is something that belongs to the immaterial mind, and aren’t equivalent to the causes of the perception - i.e. the sensations. I’m using psychology terminology, but he described it a little bit differently and this is more precise. Anyway, the whole defence against such a “this is what makes you perceive something” argument is this: the cause of your perception (the sensations, neurons firing, etc.) aren’t equivalent to the perception itself. So, the fact that you stubbed your toe and nerve fibres are bringing that message to your brain, doesn’t equal the fact that you, as an immaterial mind thing, realize “ow my toe”.
That’s all well and good, but that’s why the term perception exists separately from the term sensation. They’re different things. You could have perfect vision, and see everything, and yet think you’re blind, because you aren’t getting the perception part. You might even look at someone while speaking to them, and your neurons are reacting, but you’d still say you don’t see them. But I don’t see that as proof that the mind is somehow different from the brain and the neurons in it and the difference cortices and etc.
The fact that you can’t see the mind doesn’t mean it’s not there - if I can track every single little thing leading to you feeling pain, why is it somehow separate and special? That’s what gets to me about this particular argument, anyway, but I let it slide when the professor gave it to me as an answer because I don’t want to get the class off track. Things to do and discuss and whatnot. But, really, it’s not that I think the argument is wrong that bothers me. It’s the fact that I can’t bring myself to consider it seriously because I think I’m so smart and have all the real answers already. Well, not consciously. But on some level that’s obviously going on.
You don’t get a good wrap-up of this post because I have to go to class. Everything I wanted to say is here, so there! Good for you if you wanted to read it. If not, I probably went on for way too long. Ah well.
